FREUD AND THE NON-EUROPEAN

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There are two ways in which I shall be using the term "non-European" in this lecture — one that applies to Freud's own time; the other to the period after his death in 1939. Both are deeply relevant to a reading of his work today. One, of course, is a simple designation of the world beyond Freud's own as a Viennese-Jewish scientist, philosopher and intellectual who lived and worked his entire life in either Austria or England. No one who has read and been influenced by Freud's extraordinary work has failed to be impressed by the remarkable range of his erudition, especially in literature and the history of culture. But by the same token, one is very struck by the fact that beyond the confines of Europe, Freud's awareness of other cultures (with perhaps one exception, that of Egypt) is inflected, and, indeed shaped by his education in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, particularly the humanistic and scientific
assumptions that give it its peculiarly “Western” stamp. This is something that doesn’t so much limit Freud in an uninteresting way as identify him as belonging to a place and time that were still not tremendously bothered by what today, in the current postmodern, post-structuralist, postcolonialist jargon, we would call the problems of the Other. Of course Freud was deeply gripped by what stands outside the limits of reason, convention, and, of course, consciousness: his whole work in that sense is about the Other, but always about an Other recognizable mainly to readers who are well acquainted with the classics of Graeco-Roman and Hebrew Antiquity and what was later to derive from them in the various modern European languages, literatures, sciences, religions and cultures with which he himself was well acquainted.

Like most of his contemporaries, Freud knew that other, noteworthy cultures existed and deserved recognition. He referred to those of India and China, for instance, but only in passing and only when, say, the practice of dream interpretation there might be of comparative interest to the European investigator of the subject. Much more frequent are Freud’s references to the “primitive” non-European cultures — mostly via James Frazer — on which he drew for his discussion of early religious practices. These references provide most of the substance for Totem and Taboo,8 but Freud’s ethnographic curiosity hardly goes beyond looking at and citing aspects of these cultures (sometimes with a numbing repetitiveness) as supporting evidence for his argument about such matters as defilement, prohibitions against incest, and patterns of exogamy and endogamy. To Freud, the Pacific, Australian and African cultures he took so much from had been pretty much left behind or forgotten, like the primal horde, in the march of civilization; and even though we know how much of Freud’s work is dedicated to recovering and acknowledging what has either been forgotten or won’t be admitted, I don’t think that in cultural terms non-European primitive peoples and cultures were as fascinating to him as were the people and stories of Ancient Greece, Rome and Israel. The latter were his real predecessors in terms of psychoanalytic images and concepts.

Nevertheless, in view of the dominant race theories of the time, Freud had his own ideas about non-European outsiders, most notably Moses and Hannibal. Both were Semites, of course, and both (especially Hannibal) were heroes for Freud because of their audacity, persistence and courage. Reading Moses and Monotheism,9 one is struck by Freud’s almost casual assumption (which also
applies to Hannibal) that Semites were most certainly not European (in fact, Hannibal spends his life fruitlessly trying to conquer Rome, but never even gets there) and, at the same time, were somehow assimilable to its culture as former outsiders. This is quite different from theories about Semites propounded by Orientalists like Renan and racial thinkers such as Gobineau and Wagner, who underlined the foreignness and excludability of Jews – as well as Arabs, for that matter – to Graeco-Germanic-Aryan culture. Freud's view of Moses as both insider and outsider is extraordinarily interesting and challenging, I think, but I want to talk about this later. In any event, I believe it is true to say that Freud's was a Eurocentric view of culture – and why should it not be? His world had not yet been touched by the globalization, or rapid travel, or decolonization, that were to make many formerly unknown or repressed cultures available to metropolitan Europe. He lived just before the massive population shifts that were to bring Indians, Africans, West Indians, Turks and Kurds into the heart of Europe as guest-workers and often unwelcome immigrants. And, of course, he died just as the Austro-Germanic and Roman world portrayed so memorably by great contemporaries such as Thomas Mann and Romain Rolland would lie in ruins, with millions of his fellow Jews slaughtered by the Nazi Reich. In effect, it was also the world commemorated in Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis*, the autumnal exilic book written during the war years in Istanbul, whence this great Gelehrter and philologist could sum up the passing of a tradition seen in its coherent wholeness for the last time.

The second – and far more politically charged – meaning of "the non-European" that I'd like to draw attention to is the culture that emerged historically in the post-World-War-Two period – that is, after the fall of the classical empires and the emergence of many newly liberated peoples and states in Africa, Asia and the Americas. Obviously, I cannot go into the many new configurations of power, people and politics that have resulted, but I would like to stress one in particular that seems to me to give a rather fascinating perspective, and indeed enhances the radicality of Freud's work on human identity. What I have in mind is how, in the postwar world, that constellation of words and valences that surrounds Europe and the West acquired a much more fraught and even rebarbative meaning from observers outside Europe and the West. Because of the Cold War, there were first of all two Europes, East and West; and then, in the peripheral regions of the world going
through the throes of decolonization, there was the Europe that was representative of the great empires, now seething with insurrections that were finally to develop into struggles beyond European and Western control. Elsewhere I have tried to describe the new light in which Europe is now seen by articulate anticolonial combatants, so I won’t go into it here, except briefly to quote Fanon – surely Freud’s most disputatious heir – from the final pages of his last, posthumously published book, *The Wretched of the Earth*. The section I shall be citing is one of the appendices to the book entitled “Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders”, in which – as you will recall – Fanon catalogues and comments on a series of cases he has dealt with that emanate, as it were, from the colonial battlefield.

First of all, he notes that to the European, the non-European world contains only natives, and “the veiled women, the palm trees and the camels make up the landscape, the natural background to the human presence of the French”. After listing how the native is diagnosed by the European clinical psychiatrist as a savage killer who kills for no reason, Fanon cites a Professor A. Porot, whose considered scientific opinion is that the native’s life is dominated by “diencephalic urges” whose net result is an undevelopable primitivism.

Here Fanon quotes a chilling passage from a learned technical psychiatric analysis by Professor Porot himself:

This primitivism is not merely a way of living which is the result of a special upbringing; it has much deeper roots. We even consider that it must have its substratum in a particular predisposition of the architectonic structure, or at least in the dynamic hierarchization of the nervous centers. We are in the presence of a coherent body of comportment and of a coherent life which can be explained scientifically. The Algerian has no cortex; or, more precisely, he is dominated, like the inferior vertebrates, by the diencephalons. The cortical functions, if they exist at all, are very feeble, and are practically unintegrated into the dynamic of existence.

While it may be possible to see in this sort of thing a fundamentalist perversion of Freud’s description of primitive behaviour in *Totem and Taboo*, what seems to be missing is Freud’s implicit refusal, in the end, to erect an insurmountable barrier between non-European primitives and European civilization; on the contrary, the severity of Freud’s argument, as I read it, is that what
may have been left behind historically catches up with
us in such universal behaviours as the prohibition
against incest, or — as he characterizes it in *Moses and
Monotheism* — the return of the repressed. Of course,
Freud posits a qualitative difference between primitive
and civilized that seems to work to the latter’s advan-
tage, but that difference, as in the fiction of his equally
gifted subversive contemporary Joseph Conrad, doesn’t
excuse or in any way mitigate the rigour of his analyses
of civilization itself, which he sees in a decidedly
ambiguous, even pessimistic, way.

The point for Fanon, though, is that when you extend
not just Freud, but all the scientific achievements of
European science, into the practice of colonialism, Eu-
rope ceases to occupy a normative position with regard to
the native. Hence, Fanon proclaims:

leaves this Europe where they are never done talking
of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find
them, at the corner of every one of their own streets,
in all the corners of the globe. . . . Europe undertook
the leadership of the world with ardor, cynicism,
and violence. Look at how the shadow of her palaces
stretches out ever further! Every one of her move-
ments has burst the bounds of space and thought.

Europe has declined all humility and all modesty;
but she has also set her face against all solicitude
and tenderness. . . . When I search for Man in the
technique and the style of Europe, I see only a
succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of
murders.

Not surprisingly, then, and even though his prose and
some of his reasoning depend on it, Fanon rejects the
European model entirely, and demands instead that all
human beings collaborate together in the invention of
new ways to create what he calls “the new man, whom
Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant
birth”.¹³

Fanon himself scarcely provides his readers with
anything like a blueprint for the new ways he has in
mind; his main purpose, however, is to indict Europe for
having divided human beings into a hierarchy of races
that reduced and dehumanized the subordinates to both
the scientific gaze and the will of the superiors. The
actualization of the scheme, of course, is what was
brought forth by the colonial system in the imperial
domains, but I think it is true to say that the gist of
Fanon’s attack was to include the whole edifice of Euro-
pean humanism itself, which proved incapable of going
beyond its own invidious limitations of vision. As Immanuel Wallerstein described so well, subsequent critics of Eurocentrism in the last four decades of the twentieth century furthered the attack by taking on Europe's historiography, the claims of its universalism, its definition of civilization, its Orientalism, and its uncritical acceptance of a paradigm of progress that placed what Huntington and others like him have called "the West" at the centre of an encroaching mass of lesser civilizations trying to challenge the West's supremacy.

However much or little one agrees with Fanon or Wallerstein, there is no doubt that the whole idea of cultural difference itself - especially today - is far from the inert thing taken for granted by Freud. The notion that there were other cultures besides that of Europe about which one needed to think is really not the animating principle for his work that it was in Fanon's, any more than it was for the major work of his contemporaries Thomas Mann, Romain Rolland and Erich Auerbach. Of the four, Auerbach was the one who survived somewhat into the postcolonial era, but he was mystified - perhaps even a little depressed - by what he could intimate of what was coming. In his late essay "Philologie der Weltliteratur" he spoke elegiacally of the replacement of Romania as the research paradigm that had nourished his own career by a welter of what he called "new" languages and cultures, without realizing that many of them in Asia and Africa were older than those of Europe, and had well-established canons and philologies that European scholars of his generation simply never knew existed. At any rate, Auerbach had the capacity to sense that a new historical era was being born, and he could tell that its lineaments and structures would be unfamiliar precisely because so much in it was neither European nor Eurocentric.

I feel I should add something else here. I have often been interpreted as retrospectively attacking great writers and thinkers like Jane Austen and Karl Marx because some of their ideas seem politically incorrect by the standards of our time. That is a stupid notion which, I just have to say categorically, is not true of anything I have either written or said. On the contrary, I am always trying to understand figures from the past whom I admire, even as I point out how bound they were by the perspectives of their own cultural moment as far as their views of other cultures and peoples were concerned. The special point I then try to make is that it is imperative to read them as intrinsically worthwhile for today's non-European or non-Western reader, who is often either happy to dismiss them altogether as dehumanizing or
insufficiently aware of the colonized people (as Chinua Achebe does with Conrad’s portrayal of Africa), or reads them, in a way, “above” the historical circumstances of which they were so much a part. My approach tries to see them in their context as accurately as possible, but then – because they are extraordinary writers and thinkers whose work has enabled other, alternative work and readings based on developments of which they could not have been aware – I see them contrapuntally, that is, as figures whose writing travels across temporal, cultural and ideological boundaries in unforeseen ways to emerge as part of a new ensemble along with later history and subsequent art. So, for instance, rather than leaving Conrad’s compelling portrait of Leopold’s Congo in an archive labelled as the dead-end rubbish bin of racist thinking, it seems to me far more interesting to read Conrad’s late-nineteenth-century work as – in all sorts of unforeseen proleptic ways – suggesting and provoking not only the tragic distortions in the Congo’s subsequent history but also the echoing answers in African writing that reuse Conrad’s journey motif as a topos to present the discoveries and recognitions of postcolonial dynamics, a great part of them the deliberate antitheses of Conrad’s work. Thus – to give a brief pair of examples – you have the radically different responses embodied in Tayib Salih’s Mawsim al Hijra illal Shimal and V.S. Naipaul’s A Bend in the River. These two works couldn’t be more different from each other, but both are unimaginable without the structure of Conrad’s prior imaginative feat to guide and then push them, so to speak, into new avenues of articulation true to the vision of a Sudanese Arab’s experience in the 1960s and that of a Trinidadian Indian expatriate a few years later. The interesting result is not only that Salih and Naipaul depend so vitally on their reading of Conrad, but that Conrad’s writing is further actualized and animated by emphases and inflections that he was obviously unaware of, but that his writing permits.

Thus later history reopens and challenges what seems to have been the finality of an earlier figure of thought, bringing it into contact with cultural, political and epistemological formations undreamed of by – albeit affiliated by historical circumstances with – its author. Every writer is, of course, a reader of her or his predecessors as well, but what I want to underline is that the often surprising dynamics of human history can – as Borges’ fable of Pierre Menard and the Quixote so wittily argues – dramatize the latencies in a prior figure or form that suddenly illuminate the present. The horribly attenuated and oppressed black porters and savages that
Conrad portrays in terms that Achebe finds so objectionable not only contain within them the frozen essence that condemns them to the servitude and punishment Conrad sees as their present fate, but also point prophetically towards a whole series of implied developments that their later history discloses despite, over and above, and also paradoxically because of, the radical severity and awful solitude of Conrad’s essentializing vision. The fact that later writers keep returning to Conrad means that his work, by virtue of its uncompromising Eurocentric vision, is precisely what gives it its antinomian force, the intensity and power wrapped inside its sentences, which demand an equal and opposite response to meet them head on in a confirmation, a refutation, or an elaboration of what they present. In the grip of Conrad’s Africa, you are driven by its sheer stifling horror to work through it, to push beyond it as history itself transforms even the most unyielding stasis into process and a search for greater clarity, relief, resolution or denial. And of course in Conrad, as with all such extraordinary minds, the felt tension between what is intolerably there and a symmetrical compulsion to escape from it is what is most profoundly at stake — what the reading and interpretation of a work like Heart of Darkness is all about. Texts that are inertly of their time stay there: those which brush up unstintingly against historical constraints are the ones we keep with us, generation after generation.

Freud is a remarkable instance of a thinker for whom scientific work was, as he often said, a kind of archaeological excavation of the buried, forgotten, repressed and denied past. Not for nothing was Schliemann a model for him. Freud was an explorer of the mind, of course, but also, in the philosophical sense, an overturner and a re-mapper of accepted or settled geographies and genealogies. He thus lends himself especially to rereading in different contexts, since his work is all about how life history offers itself by recollection, research and reflection to endless structuring and restructuring, in both the individual and the collective sense. That we, different readers from different periods of history, with different cultural backgrounds, should continue to do this in our readings of Freud strikes me as nothing less than a vindication of his work’s power to instigate new thought, as well as to illuminate situations that he himself might never have dreamed of.

Freud’s intense concentration on Moses occupied the last months of his life, and what he produced in his last major book, Moses and Monotheism, is a composite of several texts, numerous intentions, different periods of
time—all of them personally difficult for him in view of his illness, the advent of National Socialism and the political uncertainties of his life in Vienna which meant that he had to contend with sometimes contradictory and even disorganizing, destabilizing effects. Anyone with an interest in what has been called late style [Spätstil] will find in Freud's Moses an almost classic example. Like the bristlingly difficult works that Beethoven produced in the last seven or eight years of his life—the last five piano sonatas, the final quartets, the Missa Solemnis, the Choral Symphony, and the Opus 119 and 121 Bagatelles—Moses seems to be composed by Freud for himself, with scant attention to frequent and often ungainly repetition, or regard for elegant economy of prose and exposition. In this book, Freud the scientist looking for objective results in his investigation, and Freud the Jewish intellectual probing his own relationship with his ancient faith through the history and identity of its founder, are never really brought into a tidy fit with each other. Everything about the treatise suggests not resolution and reconciliation—as in some late works such as The Tempest or The Winter's Tale—but, rather, more complexity and a willingness to let irreconcilable elements of the work remain as they are: episodic, fragmentary, unfinished (i.e. unpolished).

In Beethoven's case and in Freud's, as I hope to show, the intellectual trajectory conveyed by the late work is intransigence and a sort of irascible transgressiveness, as if the author was expected to settle down into a harmonious composure, as befits a person at the end of his life, but preferred instead to be difficult, and to bristle with all sorts of new ideas and provocations. Freud explicitly confesses to this unseemliness in a footnote early in Moses where, without embarrassment, he refers to his autocratic, arbitrary and even unscrupulous way with biblical evidence. There are also explicit reminders to the reader that the author is an old man, and may not be up to his task; at the end of the second part and the beginning of the third Freud draws attention to his failing strength as well as to the diminishment in his creative powers. But this admission doesn't stop or in any way deter him from reaching difficult and often mystifyingly unsatisfactory conclusions. Like Beethoven's late works, Freud's Spätwerk is obsessed with returning not just to the problem of Moses's identity—which, of course, is at the very core of the treatise—but to the very elements of identity itself, as if that issue so crucial to psychoanalysis, the very heart of the science, could be returned to in the way that Beethoven's late work returns to such basics as tonality and rhythm.
Moreover, the combination in Freud of interest in the contemporary expressed in sometimes arcane excavations of the primordial are parallel to Beethoven's use of medieval modes and startlingly advanced counterpoint in works like the Missa Solemnis. Above all, late style's effect on the reader or listener is alienating — that is to say, Freud and Beethoven present material that is of pressing concern to them with scant regard for satisfying, much less placating, the reader's need for closure.

Other books by Freud were written with a didactic or pedagogic aim in mind: Moses and Monotheism is not. Reading the treatise, we feel that Freud wishes us to understand that there are other issues at stake here — other, more pressing problems to expose than ones whose solution might be comforting, or provide a sort of resting-place.

In one of the most interesting of several books on Freud's Moses — Josef Yerushalmi's Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable — Yerushalmi expertly fills in the personal Jewish background to Freud's probing of the Moses story, including his painfully longstanding awareness of anti-Semitism in such episodes as his spoiled friendship with Carl Jung, his disappointment with his father's inability to stand up to insults, his concern that psychoanalysis might be considered only a "Jewish" science, and, centrally, his own complicated and, in my opinion, hopelessly unresolved connection to his own Jewishness, which he seemed always to hold on to with a combination of pride and defiance. Yet Freud repeats over and over that although he was a Jew he did not believe in God, and only in the most minimal way could be said to have any religious sense at all. Yerushalmi shrewdly points out that Freud seemed to have believed, perhaps following Lamarck, that "the character traits embedded in the Jewish psyche are themselves transmitted phylogenetically and no longer require religion in order to be sustained. On such a final Lamarckian assumption even godless Jews like Freud inevitably inherit and share them". So far so good. But then Yerushalmi goes on to ascribe a kind of almost desperately providential leap to Freud that I find largely unwarranted. "If monotheism", he says, "was genetically Egyptian, it has been historically Jewish". He then adds — quoting Freud — that "it is honor enough for the Jewish people that it kept alive such a tradition and produced men who lent it their voice, even if the stimulus had first come from the outside, from a great stranger" (italics added).18

This is so central a point in Freud’s argument that it bears looking into further; certainly, I think, Yerushalmi
has jumped to conclusions about what is historically Jewish that Freud himself doesn’t actually reach because, as I shall try to show, the actual Jewishness that derives from Moses is a far from open-and-shut matter, and is in fact extremely problematic. Freud is resolutely divided about it; indeed, I would go so far as to say that he is deliberately antinomian in his beliefs. You will recall that Freud’s opening sentence is an astonishingly hybristic celebration of what he has done and will do in the pages that follow, which is nothing less than “to deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons”; he then goes on to say that a feat of this kind cannot be entered into gladly or carelessly, “especially by one belonging to that people”. He does so in the interests of a truth — he minces no words at all — far more important than what are “supposed [to be] national interests”. The sarcasm in this last phrase fairly takes your breath away, as much for its arrogance as for its willingness to subordinate the interests of a whole people to what is more important: the removal of a religion’s source from its place inside the community and history of like-minded believers.¹⁹

I won’t rehearse all the main points of Freud’s arguments — I too wish to be a bit arbitrary — except to recall emphases that he makes in them. First, of course, is Moses’s Egyptian identity, and the fact that his ideas about a single God are derived entirely from the Egyptian Pharaoh, who is universally credited with the invention of monotheism. Unlike Yerushalmi, for instance, Freud goes out of his way to credit Akhenaton with this idea, insisting that it was an invention which did not exist before him; and although he says that monotheism did not take root in Egypt, Freud must have known perfectly well that monotheism returned to Egypt first in the form of primitive Christianity (which remains in the Coptic Church of today) and then via Islam, which he does in fact discuss briefly later in the text. Recent work in Egyptology in fact suggests that considerable traces of monotheism are found well before Akhenaton’s reign, and this in turn suggests that Egypt’s role in the development of the worship of one God is a good deal more significant than has often been allowed. Yerushalmi is far more anxious than Freud to scrape away all traces of monotheism from Egypt after Akhenaton’s death, and he implies that it was the genius of Judaism to have elaborated the religion well beyond anything the Egyptians knew about.

Freud, however, is more complex, and even contradictory. He grants that the Jews eliminated sun-worship from the religion they took over from Akhenaton, but
further undercuts Judaic originality by noting (a) that circumcision was an Egyptian, not a Hebrew, idea; and (b) that the Levites, surely as Judaic a group as convention says ever existed, were Moses's Egyptian followers, who had come along with him to the new place.

As for that place, Freud departs further from the conventionally attributed Israelite geography and states that it was Meribat-Qades: “in the country south of Palestine between the eastern end of the Sinai peninsula and the western end of Arabia. There they took over the worship of a god Jahve, probably from the neighbouring Arabian tribe of Midianites. Presumably other neighbouring tribes were also followers of that God”. So Freud first restores to their place components of the origin of Judaism that had been forgotten or denied along with the murder of the heroic father common to all religions, then shows — via his theory of dormancy and the return of the repressed — how Judaism constituted itself as a permanently established religion. The argument is strangely subtle and discontinuous, as anyone who has read Moses and Monotheism will quickly attest. Repression, denial and return pass before the reader almost magically as experiences from the individual to the collective: they are arrayed by Freud in a sequence of narrative followed by submerged and then manifest positivity, all of which gives rise not only to Jewishness but to the anti-Semitism that goes along with it. The main points I want to underscore are first, that all of this is given an entirely secular setting by Freud, with no concession made that I have been able to find to the divine or the extra-historical; and second, that Freud makes no effort to smooth out his story or give it a clear trajectory. This is perhaps because so much of the material he is dealing with as he chronicles the aftermath of Moses's legacy is uneven, as radically antithetical in its startlingly sharp contrast between the founding outsider and the community he established (which also killed him) as the primal words he had studied and written about decades earlier.

On one level, this is no more than to say that the elements of historical identity seem always to be composite, particularly when seminal events like the killing of the father and the exodus from Egypt are themselves so tied up in prior events. As to whether Moses can be said to be “foreign” to the Jews who adopt him as their patriarch, Freud is quite clear, even adamant: Moses was an Egyptian, and was therefore different from the people who adopted him as their leader — people, that is, who became the Jews whom Moses seems to have later created as his people. To say of Freud's relationship with
Judaism that it was conflicted is to venture an understatement. At times he was proud of his belonging, even though he was irremediably anti-religious; at other times he expressed annoyance with and unmistakable disapproval of Zionism. In a famous letter about the work of the Jewish Agency in 1930, for instance, he refused to join in an appeal to the British to increase Jewish immigration to Palestine. In fact he went so far as to condemn the transformation “of a piece of Herodian wall into a national relic, thus offending the feelings of the natives”. Five years later, having accepted a position on the board of the Hebrew University, he told the Jewish National Fund that it was “a great and blessed ... instrument ... in its endeavour to establish a new home in the ancient land of our fathers”.  

Yerushalmi rehearses both Freud’s comings and goings subtly as well, and he painstakingly shows that Freud’s Jewishness runs the entire gamut from his identity as a Jew, arising from stubborn resistance to the “compact majority”, through the whole process of recalling and accepting the tradition that develops out of Moses (and hence of reconciliation with the slain father), to the grandest idea of all: that in an act of sublimation peculiar to monotheistic religion (borrowed from Egypt: Freud can’t resist inserting that phrase), Jews subordinated sense perception to the spirit, disdained magic and mysticism, were invited “to advances in intellectuality” (I take this phrase from Strachey’s translation, since it is inexplicably left out by Jones: the German word is Geistigkeit), and “were encouraged to progress in spirituality and sublimations”. The rest of that progress, however, is yet to come in rather less evenly happy forms: “The people, happy in their conviction of possessing truth, overcome by consciousness of being the chosen, came to value highly all intellectual and ethical achievements. I shall also show how their sad fate, and the disappointments reality had in store for them, were able to strengthen all these tendencies.”  

An even more detailed analysis of the relationship between Freud’s Jewish identity and his quite convoluted attitudes, as well as actions, vis-à-vis Zionism is presented by Jacquy Chemouni in *Freud et le sionisme: terre psychanalytique, terre promise*. Although Chemouni’s conclusion is that Herzl and Freud divided the Jewish world between them – the former locating Jewishness in a specific location, the latter choosing instead the realm of the universal – the book presents a daring thesis about Rome, Athens and Jerusalem that comes quite close to Freud’s antithetical views about the history and future of Jewish identity. Rome, of course, is the visible edifice
that attracted Freud—perhaps, says Chemouni, because he saw in the city the destruction of Jerusalem’s temple and a symbol of the Jewish people’s exile and, as a result, the beginning of a desire to rebuild the temple in Palestine. Athens was a city of the mind, a generally more adequate representation of Freud’s lifelong dedication to intellectual achievement. From that vantage point, the concrete Jerusalem is an attenuation of the spiritual ascetic ideal, even if it is also a realization that loss can be addressed through the concerted labour that was in fact Zionism.

What I find interesting—whether we accept Yerushalmi’s sophisticated reclamation of Freud as a Jew forced to accede to his people’s reality in Fascist Europe and anti-Semitic Vienna in particular, or Chemouni’s somewhat more complex (a trifle fanciful?) and largely unresolved triangulation of the dilemma of exile and belonging—is that one element keeps importuning, and nagging at whoever thinks about these issues of identity in either uniformly positive or negative terms. And that element is the issue of the non-Jew, which Freud treats lackadaisically late in *Moses and Monotheism*. Jews, he says, have always attracted popular hatred, not all of which is based on reasons as good as the charge that they crucified Christ. Two of the reasons for anti-Semitism are really variations on each other: that Jews are foreigners, and that they are “different” from their hosts; the third reason Freud gives is that no matter how oppressed Jews are, “they defy oppression, [so] that even the most cruel persecutions have not succeeded in exterminating them. On the contrary, they show a capacity for holding their own in practical life, and where they are admitted, they make valuable contributions to the surrounding civilization”. As for the charge of Jews being foreigners (the implied context is, of course, European), Freud is dismissive of it, because in countries like Germany, where anti-Semitism is pervasive, the Jews have been there longer, having arrived with the Romans. On the accusation that Jews are different from their hosts, Freud backhandedly says that they are not “fundamentally so”, since they are not “a foreign Asiatic race, but mostly consist of the remnants of Mediterranean peoples and inherit their culture”.24

In the light of Freud’s early harping on Moses’s Egyptianness, the distinctions he makes here strike me as limp: both unsatisfactory and unconvincing. On several occasions Freud described himself, so far as language and culture were concerned, as German, and also Jewish; and throughout his correspondence and scientific writings he shows himself to be quite sensitive to issues
of cultural, as well as racial and national difference. To the pre-Second-World-War European, though, the term "non-European" is a relatively unmarked term denoting people who come from outside Europe – Asians, for example. But I am convinced that Freud was aware that simply saying of the Jews that they were the remnants of Mediterranean civilization, and therefore not really different, is jangly discordant with his show of force about Moses’s Egyptian origins. Could it be, perhaps, that the shadow of anti-Semitism spreading so ominously over his world in the last decade of his life caused him protectively to huddle the Jews inside, so to speak, the sheltering realm of the European?

But if we move forward very rapidly from the immediate pre- to the post-World-War-Two period, we shall immediately take note of how designations like "European" and "non-European" dramatically acquire more sinister resonances than Freud appeared to have been aware of. There is, of course, the charge made by National Socialism, as codified in the Nuremberg Laws, that Jews were foreign, and therefore expendable. The Holocaust is a ghastly monument, if that is the right word, to that designation and to all the suffering that went with it. Then there is the almost too-perfect literalization that is given the binary opposition Jew-

versus-non-European in the climactic chapter of the unfolding narrative of Zionist settlement in Palestine. Suddenly the world of Moses and Monotheism has come alive in this tiny sliver of land in the Eastern Mediterranean. By 1948 the relevant non-Europeans were embodied in the indigenous Arabs of Palestine and, supporting them, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians who were descendants of the various Semitic tribes, including the Arab Midianites, whom the Israelites had first encountered south of Palestine and with whom they had a rich exchange.

In the years after 1948, when Israel was established as a Jewish state in Palestine, what had once been a diverse, multiracial population of many different peoples – European and non-European, as happened to be the case – there occurred anew a re-schematization of races and peoples, which, to those who had studied the phenomenon in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, seemed like a parodistic re-enactment of the divisions that had been so murderous before. In this setting, Israel was internationally adopted by the Atlantic West (in fact had already been granted early title to Palestine by the Balfour Declaration of 1917) as, in effect, a quasi-European state whose fate, it seemed – in an eerie asseveration of the Fanonist argument, was to hold
non-European indigenous peoples at bay for as long as possible.

The Arabs joined the non-aligned world, which was undergirded by the global struggle against colonialism as described by Fanon, Cabral, Nkrumah and Césaire. Inside Israel, the main classificatory stipulation was that it was a state for Jews, whereas non-Jews, absent or present as so many of them were, were juridically made foreigners, despite prior residence there. For the first time since the destruction of the Second Temple, the consolidation of Jewish identity occurred in the ancient place which, as it had been during biblical times, was occupied by several other nations, races, peoples, now made foreign or driven into exile, or both.

You see, perhaps, where I am going. For Freud, writing and thinking in the mid-1930s, the actuality of the non-European was its constitutive presence as a sort of fissure in the figure of Moses — founder of Judaism, but an unreconstructed non-Jewish Egyptian none the less. Jahveh derived from Arabia, which was also non-Jewish and non-European. Yet the Egyptian realities that were contemporary with Freud, as well as Egypt’s plentiful antique history — exactly as for Verdi writing Aïda — were of interest because they had been mediated and presented for use by European scholarship, principally by way of Ernest Sellin’s book on which Moses and Monotheism draws so abundantly. There’s an almost too perfect symmetry in the fact that Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt’s great narrative genius, writes a novel about Akhenaten, Dweller in Truth, which is as complex as any story he writes, but although there are many points of view explored in order to understand retrospectively who Akhenaten was, there is no mention at all of the incipient Jewish presence in the man Moses. The novel is as resolutely Egyptian as Israel was to be Jewish.

I very much doubt that Freud imagined that he would have non-European readers, or that in the context of the struggle over Palestine, he would have Palestinian readers. But he did and does. Let us look quickly at what becomes of his excavations — both figuratively and literally — from this new set of unexpectedly turbulent, as well as startlingly relevant, perspectives. I would say, first of all, that out of the travails of specifically European anti-Semitism, the establishment of Israel in a non-European territory consolidated Jewish identity politically in a state that took very specific legal and political positions effectively to seal off that identity from anything that was non-Jewish. By defining itself as a state of and for the Jewish people, Israel allowed exclusive immigration and land-owning rights there for Jews.
only, even though there were former non-Jewish residents and present non-Jewish citizens whose rights were attenuated in the case of the latter, abrogated retrospectively in the case of the former. Palestinians who lived in pre-1948 Palestine can neither return (in the case of the refugees) nor have access to land as Jews can. Quite differently from the spirit of Freud’s deliberately provocative reminders that Judaism’s founder was a non-Jew, and that Judaism begins in the realm of Egyptian, non-Jewish monotheism, Israeli legislation counters, represses, and even cancels Freud’s carefully maintained opening out of Jewish identity towards its non-Jewish background. The complex layers of the past, so to speak, have been eliminated by official Israel. So as I read him in the setting of Israel’s ideologically conscious policies — Freud, by contrast, had left considerable room to accommodate Judaism’s non-Jewish antecedents and contemporaries. That is to say: in excavating the archaeology of Jewish identity, Freud insisted that it did not begin with itself but, rather, with other identities (Egyptian and Arabian) which his demonstration in \textit{Moses and Monotheism} goes a great distance to discover, and thus restore to scrutiny. This other non-Jewish, non-European history has now been erased, no longer to be found in so far as an official Jewish identity is concerned.

More relevant, I think, is the fact that by virtue of one of the usually ignored consequences of Israel’s establishment, non-Jews — in this case, Palestinians — have been displaced to somewhere where, in the spirit of Freud’s excavations, they can ask what became of the traces of their history that had been so deeply implicated in the actuality of Palestine before Israel? For an answer, I want to turn from the realm of politics and law to a domain much closer to Freud’s account of how Jewish monotheism originated. I think I am right in surmising that Freud mobilized the non-European past in order to undermine any doctrinal attempt that might be made to put Jewish identity on a sound foundational basis, whether religious or secular. Not surprisingly, then, we will find that when Jewish identity has been consecrated by the establishment of Israel, it \textit{is the science of archaeology} that is summoned to the task of consolidating that identity in secular time; the rabbis, as well as the scholars specializing in “biblical archaeology”, are given sacred history as their domain.\textsuperscript{27} Note that a huge number of commentators on and practitioners of archaeology — from William Albright and Edmund Wilson to Yigal Yadin, Moshe Dayan, and even Ariel Sharon — have noted that archaeology is \textit{the}
privileged Israeli science par excellence. As Magen Broshi, a noted Israeli archaeologist put it:

The Israeli phenomenon, a nation returning to its old-new land, is without parallel. It is a nation in the process of renewing its acquaintance with its own land and here archeology plays an important role. In this process archeology is part of a larger system known as yedi'at ha-Aretz, knowledge of the land (the Hebrew term is derived most probably from the German Landeskunde). ... The European immigrants found a country to which they felt, paradoxically, both kinship and strangeness. Archeology in Israel, a sui generis state, served as a means to dispel the alienation of its new citizens.\(^{28}\)

Thus archaeology becomes the royal road to Jewish-Israeli identity, one in which the claim is repeatedly made that in the present-day land of Israel the Bible is materially realized thanks to archaeology, history is given flesh and bones, the past is recovered and put in dynastic order. Such claims, of course, uncannily return us not just to the archival site of Jewish identity as explored by Freud, but to its officially (we should also not fail to add: its forcibly) sanctioned geographical locale, modern Israel. What we discover is an extraordinary and revisionist attempt to substitute a new positive structure of Jewish history for Freud's insistently more complex and discontinuous late-style efforts to examine the same thing, albeit in an entirely diasporic spirit and with different, decentring results.

This is a good moment to say that I am greatly indebted to the work of a young scholar, Nadia Abu el-Haj, whose major book is entitled Facts on the Ground: Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society. What she provides first of all is a history of systematic colonial archaeological exploration in Palestine, dating back to British work in the mid-nineteenth century. She then continues the story in the period before Israel is established, connecting the actual practice of archaeology with a nascent national ideology – an ideology with plans for the repossession of the land through renaming and resettling, much of it given archaeological justification as a schematic extraction of Jewish identity despite the existence of Arab names and traces of other civilizations. This effort, she argues convincingly, epistemologically prepares the way for a fully fledged post-1948 sense of Israeli-Jewish identity based on assembling discrete archaeological particulars – scattered remnants of masonry, tablets, bones, tombs,
into a sort of spatial biography out of which Israel emerges "visibly and linguistically, as the Jewish national home".²⁹

More significantly, she argues that this quasi-narrative biography of a land enables — if it does not actually cause — and goes hand in hand with a particular style of colonial settlement that governs such concrete practices as the use of bulldozers, the unwillingness to explore non-Israelite (e.g. Hasmonean) histories, and the habit of turning an intermittent and dispersed Jewish presence of scattered ruins and buried fragments into a dynastic continuity, despite evidence to the contrary and despite evidence of endogamous non-Jewish histories. Wherever there is overwhelming and unavoidable evidence of a multiplicity of other histories, as in the massive palimpsest of Jerusalem’s Byzantine, Crusader, Hasmonean, Israelite, and Muslim architecture, the rule is to frame and tolerate these as an aspect of Israeli liberal culture, but also to assert Israel’s national pre-eminence by hitting at the Orthodox Jewish disapproval of modern Zionism by making Jerusalem even more of a Jewish-national site.³⁰

Abu el-Haj’s meticulous deconstruction of Israeli archaeology is also a history of the negation of Arab Palestine which, for obvious reasons, has been regarded as not worthy of similar investigation. But with the emergence of post-Zionist revisionist history in Israel during the 1980s and, simultaneously, the gradual rise of Palestinian archaeology as a practice in the liberation struggle of the past twenty or so years, the heritage-style attitudes of an exclusively biblical archaeology are now being challenged. I wish I had the time to go into this here, and to discuss how the nationalist thesis of separate Israeli and Palestinian histories has begun to shape archaeological disputes in the West Bank, and how, for instance, Palestinian attention to the enormously rich sedimentations of village history and oral traditions potentially changes the status of objects from dead monuments and artifacts destined for the museum, and approved historical theme parks, to remainders of an ongoing native life and living Palestinian practices of a sustainable human ecology.³¹

Nationalist agendas, however, tend to resemble each other, especially when different sides in a territorial contest look for legitimacy in such malleable activities as reconstructing the past and inventing tradition. Abu el-Haj is therefore quite right to suggest that despite the prevalence of an underlying Enlightenment commitment to the unity of the sciences, they are really quite disunited in practice. You can immediately grasp the
ways in which archaeology in the Israeli and the Palestinian context is not the same science. For an Israeli, archaeology substantiates Jewish identity in Israel and rationalizes a particular kind of colonial settlement (i.e. a fact on the ground); for a Palestinian, archaeology must be challenged so that those “facts” and the practices that gave them a kind of scientific pedigree are opened to the existence of other histories and a multiplicity of voices. Partition (as envisaged by the Oslo process since 1993) doesn’t eliminate the contest between competing national narratives: rather, it tends to underline the incompatibility of one side with the other, thereby increasing a sense of loss and the length of the list of grievances.

Let me return finally to Freud and his interest in the non-European as it bears on his attempt to reconstruct the primitive history of Jewish identity. What I find so compelling about it is that Freud seems to have made a special effort never to discount or play down the fact that Moses was non-European — especially since, in the terms of his argument, modern Judaism and the Jews were mainly to be thought of as European, or at least belonging to Europe rather than Asia or Africa. We must once again ask: why? Certainly Freud had no thought of Europe as the malevolent colonizing power described a few decades later by Fanon and the critics of Eurocentrism, and except for his prophetic comment about angering the Palestinian Arabs by giving undue importance to Jewish monuments, he had no idea at all of what would happen after 1948, when Palestinians gradually came to see that the people who arrived from abroad to take and settle on their land seemed just like the French who came to Algeria: Europeans who had superior title to the land over the non-European natives. Neither — except very briefly — did Freud pause over how strong and often violent the reaction of decidedly non-European Arabs might have been to the forcible embodiment of Jewish identity in the nationalist fulfilment of Judaism by the Zionist movement. He admired Herzl, but I think it is correct to say that most of the time he hesitated — indeed, he equivocated — so far as Zionism itself was concerned. From an instrumental point of view, Moses had to be a non-European so that in murdering him the Israelites would have something to repress, and also something to recall, elevate and spiritualize during the course of their great adventure in the rebuilding of Israel overseas. That is one way to interpret what Yerushalmi calls Freud’s interminable Judaism: that it was condemned to remember what it could not easily forget, but that it pressed on with making Israel
stronger and more powerful none the less.

But that, I think, is not the only interpretative option. Another, more cosmopolitan one is provided by Isaac Deutscher’s concept of the non-Jewish Jew. Deutscher argues that a major dissenting tradition within Judaism is constituted by heretical thinkers like Spinoza, Marx, Heine and Freud; these were prophets and rebels who were first persecuted and excommunicated by their own communities. Their ideas were powerful critiques of society; they were pessimists who believed that scientific laws governed human behaviour; their thinking was dialectical and conceived of reality as dynamic, not static, and human reality for them was (as in Freud’s case) typified by the homme moyen sensuel “whose desires and cravings, scruples and inhibitions, anxieties and predicaments are essentially the same no matter to what race, religion, or nation he belongs”; they “agree on the relativity of moral standards”, giving no one race, or culture, or God a monopoly of reason or virtue; finally, Deutscher says, they “believed in the ultimate solidarity of man”, even though in the late twentieth century the horrors of our time compelled Jews to embrace the nation-state (which is “the paradoxical consummation of the Jewish tragedy”); even though, as Jews, they had once preached “the international society of equals as the Jews were free from all Jewish and non-Jewish orthodoxy and nationalism”.

Freud’s uneasy relationship with the orthodoxy of his own community is very much a part of the complex of ideas so well described by Deutscher, who forgets to mention what I think is an essential component of it: its irremediably diasporic, unhoused character. This is a subject which George Steiner has celebrated with great élan for many years. But I would want to qualify Deutscher by saying that this needn’t be seen only as a Jewish characteristic; in our age of vast population transfers, of refugees, exiles, expatriates and immigrants, it can also be identified in the diasporic, wandering, unresolved, cosmopolitan consciousness of someone who is both inside and outside his or her community. This is now a relatively widespread phenomenon, even though an understanding of what that condition means is far from common. Freud’s meditations and insistence on the non-European from a Jewish point of view provide, I think, an admirable sketch of what it entails, by way of refusing to resolve identity into some of the nationalist or religious herds in which so many people want so desperately to run. More bold is Freud’s profound exemplification of the insight that even for the most definable, the most identifiable, the most stubborn
communal identity — for him, this was the Jewish identity — there are inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one, Identity.

Freud's symbol of those limits was that the founder of Jewish identity was himself a non-European Egyptian. In other words, identity cannot be thought or worked through itself alone; it cannot constitute or even imagine itself without that radical originary break or flaw which will not be repressed, because Moses was Egyptian, and therefore always outside the identity inside which so many have stood, and suffered — and later, perhaps, even triumphed. The strength of this thought is, I believe, that it can be articulated in and speak to other besieged identities as well — not through dispensing palliatives such as tolerance and compassion but, rather, by attending to it as a troubling, disabling, destabilizing secular wound — the essence of the cosmopolitan, from which there can be no recovery, no state of resolved or Stoic calm, and no utopian reconciliation even within itself. This is a necessary psychological experience, Freud says, but the problem is that he doesn't give any indication of how long it must be tolerated or whether, properly speaking, it has a real history — history being always that which comes after and, all too often, either overrides or represses the flaw. The questions Freud therefore leaves us with are: can so utterly indecisive and so deeply undetermined a history ever be written? In what language, and with what sort of vocabulary?

Can it aspire to the condition of a politics of diaspora life? Can it ever become the not-so-precarious foundation in the land of Jews and Palestinians of a bi-national state in which Israel and Palestine are parts, rather than antagonists of each other's history and underlying reality? I myself believe so — as much because Freud's unresolved sense of identity is so fruitful an example, as because the condition he takes such pains to elucidate is actually more general in the non-European world than he suspected.